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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3188 
___________ 
 
ADA BANKS-SCOTT, 
ANTONIO JONES; 
SONYA JONES 
 
ADA BANKS-SCOTT, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; P/O SANSHERRYSE FRISBY, INDIVIDUALLY 
& IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A PHILA. POLICE OFFICER; P/O JOHN DOE, 
INDIVIDUALLY & IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS A PHILA. POLICE OFFICER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-09-cv-03712) 
Magistrate Judge:  Honorable David R. Strawbridge 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 6, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 7, 2013 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
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PER CURIAM 
 Because the parties are familiar with the background, we present an abbreviated 
summary.  Represented by counsel, Appellant Ada Banks-Scott brought a civil rights 
lawsuit in state court against the City of Philadelphia and Police Officer Sansherryse 
Frisby.  Officer Frisby testified at a preliminary hearing on criminal charges lodged 
against Banks-Scott’s grandson, Antonio Jones.1  The parties encountered each other 
outside the courtroom after the hearing.  The parties offer differing accounts of what 
occurred during the incident that ensued.  No arrests were made that day, but as a result 
of the interaction, Banks-Scott was later arrested and charged with intimidation of a 
witness, retaliation against a witness, terroristic threats, and obstruction of justice.  
Banks-Scott maintains that she never made any threats.  Ultimately, the charges against 
her were dismissed. 
 In her complaint, Banks-Scott made a claim against the City pursuant to Monell v. 
New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and against Officer 
Frisby for false arrest and malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.  She also 
made state law claims against Officer Frisby for false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Defendants removed the 
action to federal court.  Following a pretrial conference, and with the agreement of 
                                              
1
 Jones and his mother, Sonya Jones, were also plaintiffs in Banks-Scott’s lawsuit.  
Sonya Jones’s claims were dismissed in March 2012, due to her failure to participate in 
pre-trial proceedings.  Antonio Jones’s claims were dismissed in July 2012, just before 
trial.  Those dismissals are not in dispute and are not at issue here. 
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Banks-Scott’s attorney, the presiding Magistrate Judge dismissed the Monell claim 
against the City and the state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress 
against Officer Frisby.  The claims that remained for trial were the Fourth Amendment 
claims for unlawful seizure and malicious prosecution, and state law claims of false 
imprisonment and malicious prosecution, against Officer Frisby as the sole defendant.  
After a two-day trial, the jury found in Defendant Frisby’s favor.  The District Court 
entered judgment.  Banks-Scott filed a pro se notice of appeal.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We begin with the scope of this appeal.  We are mindful of our jurisdiction only 
over orders specified in the notice of appeal or “fairly inferred” by the notice, see Sulima 
v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010).  Here, the notice of appeal 
indicates Banks-Scott’s intent to appeal from an order entered on July 10, 2012.  See Fed. 
R. App. P. 3(c).  No order was entered on that date, but the record shows the July 11, 
2012 entry of the Magistrate Judge’s order, dated July 10, 2012, dismissing certain claims 
after the pre-trial conference.  As noted above, the claims were dismissed with the 
agreement of Banks-Scott’s attorney.  Further, Banks-Scott identifies no errors with 
respect to those dismissed claims, so those issues are waived.  See, e.g., Bailey v. United 
Airlines, 279 F.3d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 2002) (issue is waived on appeal when identified in 
the statement of issues but not argued in the brief).  We need not address the issues any 
further.  Banks-Scott’s briefs focus instead on the trial and the jury’s verdict in favor of 
Officer Frisby, which was entered as judgment the next day, on July 12, 2012.  Given our 
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heightened duty to construe a pro se notice of appeal liberally, see Gov’t of the Virgin 
Islands v. Mills, 634 F.3d 746, 751 (2011), we conclude that the judgment can be fairly 
inferred by Banks-Scott’s notice of appeal, and we will assume jurisdiction over the 
arguments in her briefs. 
 Banks-Scott asserts that the trial court allowed questioning that “[took] focus away 
from the real issue which was the wrongful attack of the officer against myself and the 
false imprisonment of . . . myself.”  Appellant’s Brief at 4.  She maintains that she was 
not involved in the altercation with Officer Frisby, and that the evidence and transcripts 
validate her position that Officer Frisby was the one who engaged in misconduct.  See 
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-2.  Banks-Scott concedes that Officer Frisby and another 
officer testified that she threatened Officer Frisby, but she argues that their testimony was 
false.  See id. at 2.  On the record before us, which includes selected portions of the trial 
transcript, including Officer Frisby’s testimony,2 it is unclear whether Banks-Scott 
preserved her claim that the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence.  In any 
event, we conclude that Banks-Scott has not established that she is entitled to a new trial, 
as the matter turns on a credibility dispute.  A court must not substitute its judgment 
regarding the facts and witness credibility for that of the jury, especially on appeal.  See 
William A. Graham Co. v. Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 143 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Sheridan v. 
                                              
2
 Rule 10(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant 
to procure a transcript “as the appellant considers necessary.”  Albeit belatedly, Banks-
Scott arranged for a partial trial transcript comprised of the testimony of select witnesses. 
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E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1076 (3d Cir. 1996)).  In other words, it 
was the jury’s duty--not ours--to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
witnesses.  We conclude that Banks-Scott has not met the “stringent” standard of 
establishing that a miscarriage of justice would result if the jury’s verdict were to stand.  
See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1076. 
 Finally, we note that Banks-Scott also asserts that she was “not properly 
represented” by her attorney.  Appellant’s Brief at 1.  However, her dissatisfaction with 
her attorney’s performance does not entitle her to a new trial.  See Kushner v. Winterthur 
Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980) (sole remedy for ineffective legal 
representation in a civil lawsuit is a malpractice action against the offending attorney). 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
